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RETHINKING THE LAWS: NORPLANT AS A
CONDT[ON OF PROBATION FOR FEMALE
CHILD ABUSERS
With improved methods of birth control and with increasing child
abuse, is it now time to rethink what the laws should be?'
by P. Feikema Karachuk*
* The author, a graduate of Yale College, has taken a leave of absence after two
years of study at Tulane Law School to pursue a Master of Arts degree in history
at the University of New Orleans. The author thanks Susan L. Krinsky, Kirsten
H. Engel, Janet P. Peyton, Anthony S. Niedwicki, and Rebecca Tiger as well as
Mimi C. Meng, Sylvia D.L. Wagner, and the staff of In the Public Interest. This
article originated as a paper presented in the Bioethics Seminar led by Associate
Dean Susan L. Krinsky at Tulane Law School in the spring of 1994. The author
dedicates this article to D. Karachuk Feikema.
INTRODUCTION
On December 10, 1990, the United States Food & Drug
Administration announced its approval of a new contraceptive called
Norplant.2 Less than one month later, a California state trial judge
ordered a woman convicted of child abuse to use Norplant as a
condition of probation.3
This article examines some of the constitutional and ethical
implications of the imposition of Norplant as a condition of probation
for female child abusers.4 Section I describes the nature and extent
1 Ruth Tucker, Judge Orders Contraception, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1991, at
B6 (letter to the editor).
2 Philip J. Hilts, U.S. Approves Contraceptives Planted in Skin, N.Y. Tmfs,
Dec. 11, 1990, at Al, B10.
3 Mark A. Stein, Judge Stirs Debate with Ordering of Birth Control, L.A.
TIMs, Jan. 10, 1991, at A3, A31.
4 The constitutional issues examined in this paper are those that arise in any
instance in which a court orders a woman convicted of child abuse to use
Norplant as a condition of probation. Constitutional issues not examined in this
paper are those that arise only as a result of the particular circumstances of
individual cases. Constitutional issues not examined in this paper include the
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of child abuse and child neglect in the United States today.5 Section
II describes the contraceptive Norplant and the advantages and risks
associated with its use. Section III reviews the right to privacy and
the right to procreation and discusses how the imposition of Norplant
as a condition of probation for a female child abuser conflicts with
them. Section IV reviews the rights to liberty, to bodily integrity, and
to medical self-determination and discusses how the imposition of
Norplant as a condition of probation for a female child abuser
conflicts with them. Section V reviews the permissibility of state
limitations on fundamental rights and argues that the imposition of
Norplant as a condition of probation for a female child abuser is a
permissible limitation. Section VI reviews the right to be free from
cruel and unusual punishment and argues that the imposition of
Norplant as a condition of probation for a female child abuser is not
cruel and unusual punishment. Section VII reviews the right to equal
protection of the laws where a state-created classification
discriminates on the basis of gender and argues that the imposition of
Norplant as a condition of probation for a female child abuser denies
women equal protection of the laws. This article concludes that the
imposition of Norplant as a condition of probation for female child
abusers is not constitutionally permissible at the present time, but will
become so in the near future, upon the development and approval of
a birth-control method for men comparable to Norplant and the
imposition of that comparable birth-control method for men as a
condition of probation for male child abusers.
I Child Abuse: The Problem
The term "child abuse" encompasses any situation in which
a child suffers serious harm by the act of a parent, guardian, or
caretaker. The United States Congress, in The Child Abuse
Prevention and Treatment Act, defined "child abuse and neglect" as
"the physical or mental injury, sexual abuse or exploitation, negligent
treatment, or maltreatment of a child by a person who is responsible
for the child's welfare, under circumstances which indicate that the
right to free exercise of religion, and the right to equal protection of the laws
where the imposition of Norplant discriminates on the basis of race or on the
basis of wealth.
5 Hereafter, the term "child abuse" will subsume the term "child neglect."
See infra notes 6-12 and accompanying text.
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child's health or welfare is harmed or threatened thereby.... ,6
Cases of child abuse can be separated into four categories:
physical abuse, neglect, sexual abuse, and psychological abuse! The
term "physical abuse" refers to the infliction of physical injury upon
a child through such methods as beating, punching, kicking, bruising,
and burning.8 The term "neglect" refers to the failure to meet the
basic physical, emotional, and educational needs of a child.9 The
term "sexual abuse" refers to the sexual exploitation of a child
through such acts as fondling, intercourse, incest, and sodomy."0 The
term "psychological abuse" refers to the infliction of any injury that
"cause[s] or could potentially cause.. ." a child to suffer "serious
behavioral, emotional, cognitive, or mental disorders .... "" Almost
all cases of child abuse incorporate more than one category of
maltreatment.12
Child abuse is a problem of horrific proportions in the United
States today. An estimated 2,936,000 children were reported to have
been abused in this country in 1992.13 Forty-five percent of those
children suffered primarily neglect.14 Twenty-seven percent suffered
primarily physical abuse.15 Seventeen percent suffered primarily
6 42 U.S.C. § 5106g(4) (1994).
7 R. BARRI FLOWERS, THE VICrIMIZATON AND EXPLOITATION OF WOMEN
AND CHILDREN: A STUDY OF PHYSICAL, MENTAL, AND SExUAL MALTREATMENT
IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (1994).
8 1d.
9 1d.
'0Id at 6-7.
11 d. at7.
12 Id,
13 Karen McCurdy & Deborah Daro, The National Committee for Prevention
of Child Abuse, Child Maltreatment: A National Survey of Reports and
Fatalities, 91. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 75, 77-81 (Mar. 1994).
14 Id. at 84.
i5 ad
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sexual abuse. 6 Seven percent suffered primarily psychological
abuse. ' An estimated 1,261 of the nearly three-million children
abused in the United States in 1992 died as a result of maltreatment."8
"A conservative estimate is that reabuse occurs in at least half of all
cases."'
19
Child abuse is a symptom of a parent's inability to endure the
pressures of life. "[A]busive attacks tend to be triggered by stress and
frustration which may cause reduction or loss of self control." 20 The
stressors that incite a parent to abuse or neglect her child are varied.
Child abuse often results from "an intergenerational cycle.. ." in
which a child who suffers abuse becomes a parent who inflicts
abuse.2' In fact, "[miost child abusers were themselves the victims
of abuse." A parent's dependence on alcohol or drugs also
contributes to child abuse. "In most cases of maltreatment, alcohol
or drugs have been shown to be a factor." A family's economic
distress increases the likelihood of child abuse. Children from low-
income families face significantly higher rates of victimization than
children from higher-income families. A family's social isolation is
another risk factor associated with child abuse.' The lack of personal
and physical support denies to parents and children alike access to
16 id-
7 id.
'Id. at 86.
19 Michael S. Wald & Sophia Cohen, Preventing ChildAbuse -- What Will It
Take?, 20 FAM. L.Q. 281 n.1 (1986-87) (citing Magura, Are Services to Prevent
Foster Care Effective, 3 CHILDREN AND YOUTH SERvicEs REV. 193 (1981)).
20 David G. Gil, Unraveling Child Abuse, in CHILD ABUSE AND VIOLENCE 12
(David G. Gil ed., 1979).
21 FLOWERs, supra note 7, at 17.
22Ild
23 id
24 id
2 Id. at 45.
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resources that could alleviate some of their problems.26
Despite the variety of contributory stressors, child abuse is
ultimately viewed as a symptom of a parent's inability to endure the
pressures of parenthood. Rearing children induces stress. Pregnancy,
childbirth, and parenting are all highly stressful undertakings. The
risk of child abuse increases as the number of children for which a
parent is responsible increases. The average size of families in which
abuse takes place "substantially exceeds the national average." 7
Abused children come from families with four or more children
approximately twice as often as the population as a whole.2
"Mothers with large families[,] ... who at the same time either (1)
were not employed fulltime, (2) had a traditional gender role
orientation, or (3) received little help from the father in child care-
giving responsibilities, would seem to be prime candidates for a high
level of frustration or stress .... [S]uch mothers [are] substantially
more likely to resort to severe physical violence toward their children
than [are] other mothers." 9
Child abuse, a symptom of the inability of parents to cope
with the stress of life in general and of parenthood in particular, can
be curtailed through the reduction or elimination of such stress. A
fundamental part of the process of stress reduction and elimination is
the prevention of additional stress. Additional stress includes
additional children.
II. Norplant: A Part of the Solution?
Norplant, a contraceptive device available only by physician's
prescription., consists of six silicone capsules, each the size of a
26 VERNON R. WmHE, WORKNG WrH CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECr 40
(1992).
2' Richard I. Light, Abused and Neglected Children in America: A Study of
Alternative Policies, 43 HARV. EDUC. REv. 574 (1973).
28 DAvID G. GIL, VIoLENcE AGAINsT CHILDREN: PHYSICAL CHILD ABUSE IN
THEUNrrED STATES 110 (1970).
29 Boyd C. Rollins & Yaw Oheneba-Sakyi, Physical Violence in Utah
Households, 5 J. oFFAM. VIOLENCE 301, 308 (1990) ("qhe rate of severe
physical violence toward children was about twice as high... when four or more
children were in the home... "'.
Norplant
IN THE PUBLIC ThTEREST
matchstick, which are implanted under the skin of a woman's upper
arm in a minor surgical procedure under local anesthetic.3" The
capsules, which can be felt and sometimes seen through the skin,
contain levonorgestrel, a synthetic form of the hormone progestin.31
The levonorgestrel diffuses into the bloodstream continuously over
a period of about five years, achieving contraception throughout that
time by suppressing ovulation, by thickening cervical mucus to
impede sperm motility and penetration into the uterus, and by
reducing the thickness of the endometrial lining of the uterus to
prevent implantation of any fertilized eggs.3
As a contraceptive, Norplant carries a number of advantages.
First, it is highly effective. Pregnancy rates associated with the use of
contraceptive methods indicate that during the first year of use,
Norplant is twice as effective a form of contraception as female
sterilization.33 Second, Norplant is very convenient. After
implantation of the capsules, a woman and her sexual partner do not
need to take any further measures to prevent pregnancy for up to five
years.' Third, Norplant minimizes the use of potentially harmful
hormones. Norplant contains only one-quarter to one-half of the,
progestin in oral contraceptives and none of the estrogen.35 Because
both of these hormones prompt adverse side effects, any reduction in
their use is advantageous3 6 Fourth, Norplant is easily reversible.
Removal of the capsules, again through minor surgery, 7 quickly
30 RoOBERT A. HATcHE ETAL., CONTRACEFIvE TECHNOLOGY, 1990-1992,
at 303 (15th ed. 1990).
31 Jan Flattum-Riemers, M.D., Norplant: A New Contraceptive, 44 Am.
FAM. PHYSICrAN 103, 110, 103 (July 1991).
32 Id. at 103 (citations omitted).
33 Physicians' Desk Reference 2565 (48th ed. 1994).
34 Hatcher et al., supra note 30, at 306.
35 Flattum-Riemers, supra note 31, at 103.
36 id
37 Physician's Desk Reference supra note 33, at 2568. While thirteen
percent of Norplant implant removals involve some difficulties, "O1ess than half
of these removal difficulties...cause[] inconvenience to the patient." Id
However, in September of 1993, an unidentified woman, claiming that she
suffered injury from the removal of Norplant capsules, filed suit in Cook County,
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results in the restoration of fertility.38 Effective, convenient, relatively
safe, and reversible, Norplant has been hailed as "the dream method"
of contraception.
Norplant, however, is not the dream method of contraception
for all women. Some women are not able to use Norplant safely.
Due to the risks associated with hormonal therapy in general,
Norplant is contraindicated for women having hypertension, diabetes,
breast cancer, cardiovascular disease, liver dysfunction, or thrombotic
disease.4 Norplant might also be inadvisable for women with
histories of depression, migraine or other headaches, high blood
pressure, elevated cholesterol or triglycerides, epilepsy, gallbladder
disease, or kidney disease.4 '
Women who do choose to use Norplant are likely to suffer
unpleasant and sometimes serious adverse side effects, the most
common of which is excessive or irregular menstrual bleeding.42
Other common side effects include acne, dermatitis, breast
tenderness, dizziness, headache, nervousness, nausea, abnormal hair
growth, hair loss, and weight gain.43 Less common complaints
include breast discharge, inflammation of the cervix, hypertension,
itching, depression, mood change, general malaise, and weight loss.'
Illinois, against Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories, the distributor of the Norplant
device in the United States. In June of 1994, that suit was certified as a class
action. Tamar Lewin, 'Dream' Contraceptive's Nightmare, N.Y. TIMEs, July 8,
1994, at A10.
38 latttm-Riemers, supra note 31, at 104. "Of women attempting
pregnancy after removal of the device, 20 percent are pregnant the first month,
49 percent are pregnant the fourth month, 73 percent are pregnant after the sixth
month, and 86 percent are pregnant by the end of the first year." Id. (citations
omitted).
39 Daniel Callahan, M.D. (Director, The Hastings Center), quoted in Hilts,
supra note 2, at Al.
40 Requirements or Incentives by Governmentfor the Use of Long-acting
Contraceptives, 267 JAMA 1818 (1992) [hereinafter Requirements].
41 HATCHER ErAL., supra note 30, at 308.
42 Id. at 309.
4'Id. at 313.
44 Id. at 313-14.
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Ninety-five percent of women using Norplant report suffering at least
one side effect.45 Sixty-one percent suffer two or more4 6 Fifteen
percent discontinue their use of Norplant during the first year due to
adverse experiences.' Twenty-five percent discontinue their use by
the end of the contraceptive's five-year period of effectiveness due to
menstrual irregularities alone.48 All told, seventy percent of women
using Norplant discontinue their use by the end of the contraceptive's
five-year period of effectiveness. 9 While the short-term side effects
of Norplant are well known, the long-term risks are not 5° The
scientific data necessary for understanding and appreciating the long-
term risks associated with the use of Norplant is simply not yet
available51
Despite Norplant's adverse side effects and its unknown risks,
its users find the device a highly satisfactory form of contraception.
Eighty-eight percent of women currently using Norplant claim to be
"very satisfied.. ." with the device.52 Seventy-four percent indicate
that they would use Norplant again in the future.53 Even women who
discontinue their use of Norplant express great satisfaction with the
device. Sixty-one percent of former Norplant users indicate that they
would use Norplant again in the future.54
45 Philip D. Darney et al., Acceptance and Perceptions ofNorplant among
Users in San Francisco, USA, 21 STuD. FAM. PLAN. 152, 156 (1990).
4 Id. at 157.
47 PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE, supra note 36, at 2565.
48 I d.
49 Id. This figure should be viewed critically, as it includes not only those
women who discontinue their use of Norplant due to adverse experiences, but
also those who do so for other reasons, such as the desire to become pregnant.
So Requirements, supra note 41, at 1818.
5 1 
.
52 Damey et al., supra note 42, at 157.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 158.
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M. The Right to Privacy and the Right to Procreation
The United States Supreme Court has held that the United
States Constitution guarantees to individuals a right to privacy.5 5 In
Griswold v. Connecticut,56 the Court observed that the "specific
guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by
emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and
substance."' Those guarantees and their penumbras overlap to create
"zones of privacy," which may be impaired by the state only in
accordance with the requirements of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 58
The right to privacy protects the freedom of individuals to
make personal decisions.59 Personal decisions require protection
from unjustified state interference because they are "basic to
individual dignity and autonomy."'  Among the personal decisions
protected under the right to privacy are those concerning
contraception, abortion, and procreation. In Griswold v. Connecticut,
the Supreme Court held that the right to privacy encompasses a
married couple's decision to use contraception.6 In Eisenstadt v.
Baird, the Court held that the right to privacy protects a single
person's decision to use contraception as well.6' In Roe v. Wade, the
Court held that the right to privacy extends to a woman's decision to
55 Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479,486 (1965). Thornburgh v. Am. College
of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,772 (1986). This right to
privacy is not explicitly stated in the constitution. Rather, it has been derived by
the court from the First, Fourth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments. U.S. Const.
amend. I, IV, IX and XIV.
56Griswol4 381 U.S. at 486 (1965).
57 Id. at 484.
58 Id. at 484.
59 Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684 (1977).
60 Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 772.
61 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
62 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 453-54 (1972).
Norplant
IN THE PUBLIC IMREST
abort a pregnancy.63 In protecting an individual's freedom to prevent
and to terminate a pregnancy, the right to privacy encompasses the
right to procreation." If an individual may choose not to conceive
and bear a child, then the individual may also choose to conceive and
bear a child.6 5 As the Eisenstadt Court declared, "If the right of
privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual... to be free
from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child. ' 66
The imposition of Norplant as a condition of probation for a
female child abuser conflicts with both the right to privacy and the
right to procreation. When a judge orders a woman to use Norplant,
the judge usurps the woman's freedom to make personal decisions
regarding contraception and procreation. Opponents of the
imposition of Norplant insist that such a 'judge... gets an 'F' for
abusing the woman's most basic human right."67 They emphasize that
"[c]hildbearing is an intimate decision that the state has no business
making." Opponents of the imposition of Norplant also argue that
no one is better situated to decide for an individual whether to use
contraceptives and whether to procreate than the individual herself.
"As worthwhile as it may be for this woman to avoid childbirth for
five years and maybe longer, who is a mere mortal to say so?''6' For
opponents of the imposition of Norplant, condoning its use as a
condition of probation propels the right to privacy and the right to
63 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). A woman's right to abort a
pregnancy continues only until the fetus is viable. Id. at 163.
64 Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,472 n.7 (1977).
65 Elizabeth Wylie, Birth Control for Child Abusers: Statutory Concerns
and Privacy Issues in Court-Enforced Contraception, 12 REV. OFLTG. 489,
508 (Spring 1993).
66 Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453 (emphasis omitted).
67 Suzanne Fields, The Birth Injunction: Frustration from the Bench, WASH.
TMs, Jan. 10, 1991, at GI (commentary).
68 Howard Broadman, Prophylactic Punishment: It's OK to Jail People or
Fine Them, but Ordering Birth Control Implants Goes Too Far, NEWSDAY, Jan.
11, 1991, at 14 (editorial).
69 Fields, supra note 67, at G1.
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procreation down a slippery slope. "If abusive mothers are targets
today, will teenagers and welfare recipients be added to the list
tomorrow? The specter ofjudges... dictating the circumstances of
pregnancy gives ominous new meaning to the term birth control."70
IV. The Right to Liberty, the Right to Bodily Integrity, and the
Right to Medical Self-Determination
The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution guarantees to
individuals the right to liberty.71 The right to liberty encompasses
"the right of an individual [to have] his person be held inviolable." 72
The inviolability of the person, also known as the right to bodily
integrity, is defined in the common law as "the right of every
individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from
all restraint or interference of others."73 In Cruzan v. Director,
Missouri Department of Health, the Court observed that "[tlhis
notion of bodily integrity has been embodied in the requirement that
informed consent is generally required for medical treatment: '74 Also
a common-law doctrine, the right to make an informed consent
requires a physician to provide a patient with all available information
regarding a proposed course of treatment, including the risks and the
alternatives, so that the patient can make an informed consent to
undergo the treatment.75 The Cruzan Court remarked that "[t]he
logical corollary of the doctrine of informed consent is that the patient
generally possesses the right not to consent, that is to refuse
70 Marilyn Gardner, Birth Control by Law, CHRISTIAN Sa. MONITOR, Jan.
15, 1991, at 15 (commentary).
71 "IjN]or [shall any State] deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend XIV § 1.
72 Crazan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,278 (1990)
(plurality opinion citing Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 439 (1957)).
73 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269 (quoting Union Pacific Ry, Co. v. Botsford, 141
U.S. 250,251 (1891)).
74 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269.
75 Janet F. Ginzberg, Compulsory Contraception as a Condition of
Probation: The Use andAbuse of Norplant, 58 BROOK. L. REv. 979, 1002
n.126 (1992) (citing In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64,70 (N.Y. 1981)).
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treatment. 76 The Court endorsed "tihe principle that a competent
person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing
unwanted medical treatment."'
The imposition of Norplant as a condition of probation for a
female child abuser is contrary to the right to bodily integrity. A
woman who receives Norplant under a judicial order suffers the
violation of her person twice. First, the implant itself violates her
physical person. The implantation procedure requires surgery that,
although minor, is invasive nonetheless. Physical violation continues
throughout the time during which the woman is forced to carry
Norplant inside her body. It ends only after a second surgical
procedure, again minor but invasive nonetheless, to remove the
implant. In her concurring opinion in Cruzan, Justice O'Connor
noted, "Because our notions of liberty are inextricably entwined with
our idea of physical freedom and self-determination, the Court has
often deemed state incursions into the body repugnant to the interests
protected by the Due Process Clause." 8 Second, the imposition of
Norplant violates the woman's sovereignty over her own person. A
judge who orders a woman to use Norplant usurps the woman's right
to control her own body. Opponents of the imposition of Norplant
worry that, "[w]hen the long "arm of the law reaches as far as the
womb, forbidding pregnancy, the concept of autonomy over one's
body is dangerously compromised., 79
The imposition of Norplant as a condition of probation for a
female child abuser is also contrary to the right to medical self-
determination. Norplant, like all medical treatments, has both
benefits and risks, which different individuals weigh differently."
Opponents of the imposition of Norplant insist that, because the
individual must bear the burden of the risks of Norplant, the decision
whether to use the contraceptive ought to be hers alone."' "Norplant
should be prescribed pursuant only to a woman's informed choice
76 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 270.
77Id at 278.
78lId. at 287 (O'CONNOR, 3., concurring).
79 Gardner, supra note 70, at 15.
80 Requirements, supra note 40, at 1818.
81Id.
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after consultation with her physician."' 2 A judge's order requiring a
woman to use Norplant effectively pre-empts the woman's right to
make an informed choice regarding medical treatment. Opponents of
the imposition of Norplant charge that such an order "flatly ignores
[the woman's] constitutional right to refuse physically intrusive
medical treatment, especially where... the treatment may actually
harm her health."83
V. The Individual's Fundamental Rights versus the State's
Compelling Interests
Opponents of the imposition of Norplant as a condition of
probation for a female child abuser are correct in noting that the
imposition of Norplant conflicts with the woman's right to privacy,
procreation, liberty, bodily integrity, and medical self-determination.
However, the Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned that the
fundamental rights of individuals under the Constitution are not
absolute. The right to privacy, the right to procreation, the right to
liberty, the right to bodily integrity, and the right to medical self-
determination all implicate the right to liberty guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment. All may thus be limited in accordance with
the requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,
the Court explained that "determining that a person has a 'liberty
interest' under the due process clause does not end the inquiry;
'whether respondent's constitutional rights have been violated must
be determined by balancing his liberty interests against the relevant
state interests.""' The balancing test to determine whether an
individual's fundamental rights may be impaired by the state was
described in Roe v. Wade: "[Rlegulation limiting these rights may be
justified only by a 'compelling state interest,' ... and... [a state
action] must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state
82 Wylie, supra note 65, at 493.
83 Rachel N. Pine, Don't Force Birth Control on Women, USA TODAY, Feb.
4, 1991, at 8A (commentary).
84 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279 (citing Youngberg v. Romero, 457 U.S. 307,321
(1982)).
Norplant
IN THE PUBLIC LNIEREST
interests at stake."' If the state's goals can be achieved through other
means which do not impair or are less restrictive of the individual's
fundamental rights, the state action will not be upheld.86 Such other
means must be currently available and "obviously workable."' They
must promise to advance the state's interests as effectively as the
challenged state action.8 A state action which impairs an indiviual's
fundamental rights must follow a compelling state interest through
means least restrictive of those rights.
With regard to the judicial imposition of a condition of
probation, the compelling interests of the state embrace the
rehabilitation of the offender and the protection of the public. In
Frank v. United States, the Supreme Court noted that "probation's
basic purpose [is to] provid[e] 'an individualized program offering a
young or unhardened offender an opportunity to rehabilitate himself
without institutional confinement'.. 82 9 In Grffin v. Wisconsin, the
Court confirmed that probation "restrictions are meant to assure that
the probation serves as a period of genuine rehabilitation and that the
community is not harmed by the probationer's being at large."' 9
"The ultimate goal of rehabilitation in a child abuse case" -
and the state's compelling interest -- "is to improve the woman's
mothering skills."9' The imposition of Norplant as a condition of
probation for a female child abuser does advance the rehabilitation of
the offender. Opponents of the imposition of Norplant are correct in
85 Roe, 410 U.S. at 155 (citing Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395
U.S. 621, 627 (1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,406 (1963); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485; Aptheker v.
Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500,508 (1964); Cantwell v. Conn., 310 U.S. 296,
307-08 (1940); Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 460,463-64).
86 See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
7Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 143 n.15 (1986).
88 Id. at 146 (citing Hughes v. Okla., 441 U.S. 322,336 (1979)).
9 Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 157-58 (1969) (quoting Roberts v.
United States, 320 U.S. 264,272 (1943)).
90 Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 875 (1987).
91 Julie Mertus & Simon Heller, Norplant Meets the New Eugenicists: The
Impermissibility of Coerced Contraception, 11 ST. LOUIS. U. PUB. L. REV.
359,373 (1992).
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noting that "Norplant prevents pregnancy, not abusive behavior."2
They are also correct in noting that "there is simply no indication that
a woman with Norplant implanted in her arm will become a better
mother as a consequence of using Norplant."'93 They are wrong,
however, in urging that "[tiemporary sterilization [sic] cannot be
justified by the mere speculation by the Court that[,] if [a child
abuser] does not have children for [the duration of her probation], she
would handle family stress better and would be less likely to
improperly discipline her children." 94 The imposition of Norplant as
a condition of probation for a female child abuser "buy[s] time.: 5 By
preventing a child abuser from becoming pregnant during her
probation, Norplant postpones her suffering the additional stresses
that come with pregnancy, with childbirth, and with responsibility for
another child. With this respite, "a convicted child abuser stands a
better chance of confronting her destructive tendencies and learning
to be a better parent if she does not simultaneously have to cope with
the emotional and financial stresses of additional children."9 A
reprieve from "the pressures of parenthood may allow the abusive
parent[ time to mature and resolve chemical dependence."' It might
also "give the mother a better chance to profit from her counseling
and to rebuild a wholesome relationship with her present children."98
The imposition of Norplant as a condition of probation for a female
child abuser serves the state's compelling interest in the rehabilitation
of the offender by affording the child abuser time to learn how to bear
92 Beverly F. Baker, Sentenced to Norplant: Woman Convicted of Child
Abuse Sentenced to Have Contraceptive Implantedfor Three Years, NETWORK
NEWS (National Women's Health Network), Jan. 1991, at 6 (letter to the editor).
93 Mertus & Heller, supra note 91, at 373.
94 Maharukh (Monica) Mubaraki, The Constitutionality of Court Imposed
Contraception as a Condition of Probation, 14 CalM. JusT. 1. 385, 391 (Fall
1992).
95 Tucker, supra note 1, at B6.
96 Stacey L. Arthur, The Norplant Prescription: Birth Control, Women
Control, or Crime Control? 40 UCLA L. REV. 1, 38 (1992).
97 Thomas E. Bartrum, Birth Control as a Condition of Probation -- A New
Weapon in the War against ChildAbuse, 80 KY. L.. 1037, 1051 (1991-1992).
98 Tucker, supra note 1, at B6.
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the stresses of parenthood and of life.
A condition of probation can also be justified if it serves the
state's compelling interest in the protection of the public. The
portion of the public most in need of protection from child abusers is
the children who are abused. As noted above, an estimated 2,936,000
children were reported to have been abused in this country in 1992."9
An estimated 1,261 of those children died as a result of
maltreatment.'0 "A conservative estimate ..." of the rate of
recidivism has reabuse occurring "in at least half of all cases."10 1 The
Supreme Court has upheld the broad exercise of state authority when
that authority is wielded to protect children."° "It is the interest of
youth itself, and of the whole community, that children be both
safeguarded from abuses and given the opportunities for growth into
free and independent well-developed men and citizens. ' 03
The imposition of Norplant as a condition of probation for a
female child abuser serves the state's compelling interest in the
protection of children. Opponents of the imposition of Norplant
contend that Norplant fails to protect a child abuser's existing children
from continuing abuse. 'Preventing [a child abuser] from having
additional children does absolutely nothing to prevent her from
abusing the ... children she has already conceived, and it does
nothing to build a safe home for those children with their mother."''3 4
However, as argued above, the imposition of Norplant as a condition
of probation for a female child abuser "buy[s] time."' 05 By
preventing a child abuser from becoming pregnant during her
probation, Norplant assures the child abuser's existing children that
their parent's efforts to learn how to bear the stresses of parenthood
and of life will not be disrupted by the additional stresses of
99 McCurdy & Daro, supra note 13, at 77-81.
0° Id. at 86.
101 Wald & Cohen, supra note 19, at 281 n.1.
102 See, e.g., Prince v. Mass., 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
13 Id at 165.
104 Helen R. Neuborne, In the Norplant Case, Good Intentions Make Bad
Law, L.A. TftmFS, Mar. 3, 1991, at Ml (commentary).
105 Tucker, supra note 1, at B6.
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pregnancy, of childbirth, and of responsibility for another child. The
imposition of Norplant as a condition of probation for a female child
abuser serves the state's compelling interest in the protection of the
child abuser's existing children.
Opponents of the imposition of Norplant as a condition of
probation for a female child abuser argue that the state's interest in the
protection of future children cannot be considered compelling. 6 In
Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court held,
With respect to the State's important and legitimate
interest in potential life, the "compelling" point is at
viability. This is so because the fetus then presumably
has the capability of meaningful life outside the
mother's womb' 7
A future child who has not even been conceived, like a fetus that has
not reached the point of viability, is not recognized as having "the
capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb."' 108 The
protection of unconceived children is therefore not a compelling state
interest and may not be relied on to justify the imposition of Norplant
as a condition of probation for a child abuser."
However, existing law offers some support for the proposition
that the state may act to protect unconceived children."10 In fact, the
state may take "the extreme course of banning future children as a
means of protecting them"' The sterilization of mentally deficient
adults is permitted "where such mental deficiency is hereditary and
106 Wylie, supra note 65, at 510.
107 Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
108 Id.
109 Wylie, supra note 65, at 510.
110Arthur, supra note 96, at 47.
111 Pine, supra note 83, at 8A.
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would probably be inherited by children.. ." born to such adults."1
Incest is prohibited to "promote the well-being of the unborn by
preventing the biological mutations that might occur in the issue of
incestuous relationships."113 Surrogacy contracts are prohibited to
prevent unconceived children from becomimig victims of child
bartering." 4 Children who might be born with genetic defects or
whose births would result from surrogacy contracts" 5 are
"endangered by their very conception. [it is impossible to protect
children from the dangers of genetic defects or child bartering once
they are conceived... .., 6 Therefore, the state may act to prevent
the conception of children who might be born with genetic defects or
whose births would result from surrogacy contracts."17 In contrast,
children whose parents might abuse them are not endangered as a
direct consequence of their conception. Such children can be
protected from child abuse after they are conceived."1 Therefore, the
112 In re Cavitt, 157 N.W.2d 171, 174 (Neb. 1968), appeal dismissed, 396
U.S. 996 (1970) (citing In re Clayton, 234 N.W. 630 (1931)); Buck v. Bell, 274
U.S. 200 (1927). But see, Matter of Truesdale, 313 N.C. 421, 329 S.E.2d 630
(1985) (upholding decision on appeal that the state had not met the requisite
burden of proof that the mentally retarded subject of the sterilization procedure
was likely to engage in sexual activity that would result in a pregnancy).
113 Jeffrey A. Parness & Susan K. Pritchard, To Be or Not to Be: Protecting
the Unborn's Potentiality of Life, 51 U. CN. L. REV. 257, 291 (1982) (citing
Bailey & McCabe, Reforming the Law of Incest, CIM. L. REV. 749,757-58
(1979)); Developments in the Law - The Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156, 1265-
66(1980).
114 Hutton Brown et al., Special Project, Legal Rights and Issues
Surrounding Conception, Pregnancy and Birth, 39 VAND. L. REV. 597, 653-654
(1986).
115 Surrogacy contracts are agreements made for the artificial insemination of
a woman - the surrogate mother - by the semen of another woman's husband -
the birth father. Subsequently, parental rights are assigned to the birth father and
his wife. The court has invalidated surrogacy contrates where the surrogate has
received money and thus, in essence sold her parental ]rights to her child. Matter
of Baby M, 109 NJ. 396,537 A.2d 1227. See also, BLAcK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1445 (6th ed. 1990).
116 Wylie, supra note 65, at 511.
17 Arthur, supra note 96, at 47.
118 See infra notes 120-121 and accompanying text.
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state may not act to prevent the conception of children whose parents
might abuse them. With regard to the imposition of Norplant as a
condition of probation for a female child abuser, the state's interest in
the protection of future children is not compelling.
But, as argued above, the state!s interests in the rehabilitation
of a child abuser and the protection of existing children are
compelling. The question then is whether the imposition of Norplant
as a condition of probation for a female child abuser is narrowly
drawn so as to serve only those interests. Opponents of the
imposition of Norplant assert that the rehabilitation of a female child
abuser and the protection of the child abuser's existing children can
be achieved through conditions of probation less restrictive of the
child abuser's fundamental rights than the imposition of Norplant." 9
Less restrictive steps that would actually further
rehabilitation include: forbidding a woman from
disciplining her children by striking them, counseling,
parenting classes, prenatal care, job assistance, and
monitoring family relationships, including, if
necessary, periodic examinations of the children by a
physician or social worker trained in identifying child
abuse. 20
Opponents of the imposition of Norplant have gone so far as to argue
that the complete denial of a child abuser's parental rights is less
restrictive than the imposition of Norplant. "[A] less restrictive
means of achieving the state's interests in rehabilitating [a child
abuser] and protecting the public would be to deny [the child abuser]
custody of existing and future children rather than imposing
mandatory birth control as a probationary condition.' 21 That such
traditional conditions of probation restrict a child abuser's
fundamental rights less than the imposition of Norplant is a
proposition open to argument. Parenting classes, counseling,
prohibition of corporal punishment, monitoring of family
119 Mubaraki, supra note 94, at 385.
12 0 Mertus & Heller, supra note 91, at 376.
121 Kristyn M. Walker, Judicial Control of Reproductive Freedom: The Use
of Norplant as a Condition of Probation 78 IOWAL. REv. 779, 807 (Mar. 1993).
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relationships, physical examinations of children, and especially
termination of custody all infringe upon an individual's right to
parent, another of the many incarnations of the right to privacy."' All
usurp the freedom of the individual to make personal decisions
regarding child rearing. All oblige the individual - and her children
- to suffer invasions of "the private realm of family life."'" The
enforcement of such traditional conditions of probation for a child
abuser requires probation officers, social workers, and other agents of
the state to repeatedly intrude in the private affairs of the individual
and of the family. Enforcement of the use of Norplant, on the other
hand, requires less frequent, less intrusive interference with the
individual's right to privacy. A probation officer would confirm the
continuing use of Norplant by a probationer during the regularly-
scheduled, state-mandated meetings between the probation officer
and the probationer. The probation "officer... just ha[s] to look for
a telltale little bulge on [the probationer's] arm."'24 In some ways,
traditional conditions of probation are more restrictive of a female
child abuser's fundamental rights than the imposition of Norplant.
Even assuming that traditional conditions of probation do
restrict a child abuser's fundamental rights less than the imposition of
Norplant, the imposition of Norplant as a condition of probation for
a female child abuser survives constitutional scrutiny. Traditional
conditions of probation fail to achieve their intended ends with
alarming frequency. The high rate of recidivism in cases of child
abuse demonstrates that traditional conditions of probation cannot be
relied upon to effect the rehabilitation of a child abuser and the
protection of a child abuser's existing children. "[I]t is ludicrous to
think that our present methods are adequate to protect children from
1 The right to parent has been recognized by the Supreme Court. In Prince
v. Massachusetts, the Court confirmed that personal decisions regarding the
rearing of children are protected under the right to privacy. "It is cardinal with
us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose
primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can
neither supply nor hinder .... And it is in recognition of this that... decisions
[of the Court] have respected the private realm of family life which the state
cannot enter." Prince, 321 U.S. at 166.
123 id
12 Mary Cantwell, Coercion and Contraception, N.Y. TIms, Jan. 27, 1991,
Section 4, at 16 (commentary).
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abuse and neglect."1" It is "now time to rethink what the laws should
be."12 This is not to suggest that traditional conditions of probation
for a child abuser should be abandoned. Although such conditions
often fail, they also often succeed. Instead, new conditions of
probation for a child abuser that heighten the effectiveness of
traditional conditions of probation need to be imposed. Norplant, for
example, reinforces the rehabilitative and protective functions of
parenting classes and family counseling. By postponing a female
child abuser's suffering the additional stresses of pregnancy, of child
birth, and of responsibility for another child, Norplant "buy[s] time[,]
... giv[ing] the mother a better chance to profit from her counseling
... .,,127 No other condition of probation can perform this function as
effectively. Other approved forms of female contraception are not
suitable alternatives, as the enforcement of their use would be
impracticable.128 Sterilization is not an appropriate substitute, as its
irreversibility would not just impair, but destroy, the woman's right
to procreation. Abstinence is not an adequate option, as it forbids
sexual intercourse, a legal activity too far removed from the offense
of child abuse to be limited constitutionally under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Also, the enforcement of
abstinence would be impracticable. The imposition of Norplant as a
condition of probation for a female child abuser is a constitutionally
permissible limitation on the individual's rights to privacy,
procreation, parent, liberty, bodily integrity, and medical self-
determination under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment because the less restrictive means currently available for
advancing the state's interests in the rehabilitation of the child abuser
and the protection of the child abuser's children do not advance those
interests as effectively as the imposition of Norplant allows.
12 Ronald Dozier, . (McLean County, Il., Cir. Ct.), quoted in William
Grady & Erik Christianson, Judge Says Birth Curb Order Holds, CHI. TaRm.,
Apr. 30, 1993, at 1.
126 Tucker, supra note 1, at B6.
127 Id
128 Arthur, supra note 96, at 88-189.
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VI. The Right to Be Free from Cruel and Unusual Punishment
The Eighth Amendment of the Constitution guarantees to
individuals the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. 29
The term "cruel and unusual punishment" is defined according to "the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society." 130 Today, it encompasses any punishment that "offends
fundamental notions of human dignity. ' 131 The right to be free from
cruel and unusual punishment proscribes not only methods of
punishment that cause severe physical pain, such as mutilation of the
body, but also those that cause severe emotional pain, such as
divestment of citizenship.3 2
Proportionality analysis aims to balance the harshness of the
punishment against the gravity of the offense.'33 As a guide,
proportionality analysis looks to the sentences imposed for other
crimes in the same jurisdiction and to the sentences imposed for the
same crime in other jurisdictions. 3" If a punishment is excessive in
relation to the crime, then proportionality analysis deems it cruel and
unusual. 35
The imposition of Norplant as a condition of probation for a
female child abuser does not conflict with the right to be free from
cruel and unusual punishment. Opponents of the imposition of
Norplant protest that "forced sterilization, even if it is temporary,
cheapens our respect for human dignity"' 136 Respect for human
dignity, however, can be defined in many ways. To opponents of the
imposition of Norplant, respect for human dignity demands the
129 "[N]or [shall] cruel and unusual punishments [be] inflicted." U.S. CONST.
amend VIII.
30 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99, 101 (1958).
131 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 270 (1972).
132 Trop, 356 U.S. at 101-102.
133 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277,284,290 (1983).
134 Id at 292.
135 Id. at 284,290.
136 Neubome, supra note 104, at MI.
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preservation of the rights of the convicted. "We have to be careful
that...we do not [tread] on people's Constitutional rights."137 To
supporters of the imposition of Norplant, respect for human dignity
mandates the protection of the victimized and the endangered. "I ask,
what is more just, allowing [a child abuser] to bear children and abuse
them in the name of protecting her rights, or thinking of and
defending the unspoken rights of the abused children?"'3 Respect for
human dignity favors a societal morality dedicated to the protection
of those individuals who are unable to protect themselves. Because
it serves to protect a child abuser's existing children, the imposition
of Norplant as a condition of probation for a female child abuser
cannot be deemed cruel and unusual punishment.
Opponents of the imposition of Norplant assert that such a
condition of probation causes a child abuser to suffer severe
emotional pain. The Norplant implant, recognizable under the
woman's skin, humiliates the child abuser by calling attention to her
wrongdoing.
Because Norplant is not invisible once implanted
under the skin, if forced to use Norplant, [a child
abuser] would wear a constant badge reminding the
world of her deviant, criminal behavior. Like
Hawthorne's Hester Pryne [sic], the adulteress forced
to wear a letter 'A' on her chest to inform the world of
her sins, [the child abuser] will be subjected to
society's use of punishment by humiliation because of
the patch on her arm. 139
Unlike Hester Prynne, a child abuser bearing a Norplant implant is
not the sole individual in her community to bear the scarlet letter.
She is joined by the nearly one-million other women in the United
States who use Norplant voluntarily.'4" As one of nearly one-million
similarly marked women, a child abuser bearing a Norplant implant
137 Ellen Barry, quoted in Bill Ainsworth, Tulare's Target of Controversy,
Recorder, Mar. 28, 1991, at I (alteration in original).
131 Carolyn Hendricks, The Norplant Sentence, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 1991,
at A20 (letter to the editor).
139 Walker, supra note 121, at 806 (citations omitted).
140 Lewin, supra note 37, at A10.
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is not likely to be singled out for "punishment by humiliation because
of the patch on her arm.""'  The imposition of Norplant as a
condition of probation for a female child abuser does not result in the
kind of severe emotional pain that would render it cruel and unusual
punishment
The imposition of Norplant could, however, result in the kind
of severe physical pain that would render it cruel and unusual
punishment. It can cause a variety of adverse side effects. As such,
Norplant is inadvisable for women with a variety of medical histories.
Moreover, the use of Norplant is contradindicated in the presence of
a variety of medical conditions. Opponents of the imposition of
Norplant properly ask what a court would do if a child abuser the
court orders to use Norplant has a medical reason not to have the
device implanted or to have the device removed. "If her body does
not tolerate the birth-control implant, should she be compelled to try
another method?"'14 In such circumstances, a court should "le[avej
to doctors the final determination as to whether the woman's health
ma[kes] her a safe candidate for the procedure."'43 "[f doctors
certif[y] that the procedure would endanger [the woman's] health,"
the court should "rescind [its] order.' 4 The court should not compel
the child abuser to try another method of birth control, as no other
method is comparable. As argued above, neither other approved
forms of female contraception nor sterilization nor abstinence is a
suitable alternative. For a child abuser whose health is endangered by
the use of Norplant, the imposition of Norplant as a condition of
probation results in severe physical pain that renders such a condition
of probation cruel and unusual punishment and thus unconstitutional
as applied to that individual. However, the imposition of Norplant as
a condition of probation for a female child abuser is not categorically
unconstitutional. Rather, the constitutionality of the imposition must
be reviewed in light of the particular medical circumstances of each
individual who receives ajudicial order to use Norplant as a condition
of probation.
141 Walker, supra note 121, at 806.
142 Fields, supra note 67, at G1.
'43 Michael Lev, Judge Is Firm on Forced Contraception, but Welcomes an
Appeal, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 11, 1991, atA17 (quoting Judge Howard Broadman,
Cal. Super. Ct.).
144 Id
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The imposition of Norplant as a condition of probation for a
female child abuser is a punishment proportional to the offense.
Opponents of the imposition of Norplant object that it is not
statutorily authorized. "Lack of legislative approval ... raises
concerns about whether the severity of the sanction in relation to the
offense has been fully considered .. .. 45 The imposition of
Norplant, however, is a legitimate exercise of the "broad discretion
in crafting conditions of probation"' 6 that probation codes routinely
grant to courts. As argued above, it serves the recognized purposes
of probation - the rehabilitation of the offender and the protection of
the public. Trial courts in a number of states, including California, 47
Indiana, 14 Texas, 149 Illinois, 50 Florida,'5' and Pennsylvania,15 2 have
embraced the imposition of Norplant as a legitimate condition of
probation for a female child abuser. The imposition of Norplant as
a condition of probation for a female child abuser cannot be deemed
cruel and unusual punishment under proportionality analysis.
145 Melissa Burke, The Constitutionality of the Use of the Norplant
Contraceptive Device as a Condition of Probation, 20 HAST. CoNsT. L.Q. 207,
239 (Fall 1992).
146 Id.
147 Stein, supra note 3, atA3, A31.
148 Order of Probation at 2, State v. Carlton, No. CR90-1937 (Lincoln
County, Neb., Ct 1991); see Arthur, supra note 95, at 6.
149 State v. Knighton, No. 601619 (Harris County, Tex., 262d Dist. CL
1991), see Elyse Ravel Rosenblum, The Irony ofNorplant, 1 TEx. J. WOMEN &
L., 275, 276 (Spring 1992); John Makeig, Surgical Deterrent: Mom Convicted
of Child Abuse Picks Birth-control Implant over Prison, HOUS. CHRON., Mar. 6,
1992, at Al; Woman's Probation Includes Birth Control Implant, DALLAS
MORNING NEVS, Oct. 7, 1993, at 36A.
150 Abusive Mother Accepts Contraceptive Implant, Ci. TRfl., Feb. 10,
1993, at 3.
151 Sentence Includes Birth Control Implant, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, July
22, 1993, at4B.
152 Woman to Use Norplant, Avoid Child Abuse Charge, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, Feb. 18, 1994, at A8.
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VII. The Right to Equal Protection of the Laws
The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution guarantees to
individuals the right to equal protection of the laws."5 3 The right to
equal protection of the laws requires the state to treat similarly
situated individuals similarly.' The state may not distinguish
between two classes of similarly situated individuals and treat them
differently, unless the state can justify its discrimination.
As reviewed above, under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, constitutional scrutiny of a state action
focuses on the state action itself. Under the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, constitutional scrutiny focuses not on
the state action itself, but on the discriminatory classification created
by the state action. A state-created classification that discriminates
on the basis of gender will be subject to intermediate scrutiny by the
Supreme Court.55 The Court first put forth the standards of
intermediate scrutiny in Craig v. Boren: 'To withstand constitutional
challenge, ... classifications by gender must serve important
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives!"' 6 Before the Court will apply the
standards of intermediate scrutiny to a state-created gender
classification, the creation of that classification must be shown to be
motivated by gender bias.57 In Personnel Administrator of
Massachusetts v. Feeney, the Court declared that "purposeful
discrimination is 'the condition that offends the Constitution." ' 158
The Court explained that discriminatory purpose "implies that the
deisionmaker... selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action
at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse
153 "[INor [shall any State] deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
154 LAWRENCE TRIE, AMRIMCAN CONSTITUTIONALLAW 438 (2d ed. 1988).
155 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
156 Id.
157 Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,271-74 (1979).
158 Id. at 274 (quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402
U.S. 1, 16).
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effects upon an identifiable group" 59 The necessary gender-based
discriminatory purpose may be express, as when a statute refers to
gender on its face.'60 It may also be implied, as when the adverse
effects of a statute gender-neutral on its face fall disproportionately
upon women. In the latter case,
a twofold inquiry is . . . appropriate. The first
question is whether the statutory classification is
indeed neutral in the sense that it is not gender based.
If the classification itself, covert or overt, is not based
upon gender, the second question is whether the
adverse effect reflects invidious gender-based
discrimination.16
A state-created gender classification, the creation of which is
motivated by gender bias, will be subject to judicial review under the
standards of intermediate scrutiny.
The imposition of Norplant as a condition of probation for
female child abusers creates a classification that discriminates on the
basis of gender. Opponents of the imposition of Norplant note that
courts do not treat female child abusers and male child abusers
similarly. Courts ordering the use of Norplant as a condition of
probation for female child abusers do not impose a like requirement
on male child abusers. "[[it is problematic that only women are
affected by these decisions. It is especially disconcerting... because
comparable probation conditions could be imposed on men pleading
guilty to child abuse charges, but no judge has done so thus far." 62
The imposition of Norplant on female child abusers without the
imposition of a similar condition of probation on male child abusers
creates a discriminatory classification based on gender.
The motivation of courts in imposing Norplant and creating
the consequent gender-based discriminatory classification is
purposeful gender-based discrimination. The adverse effects of the
imposition of Norplant as a condition of probation for child abusers
159 Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279.
160 See Craig, 429 U.S. 190.
161 Feeney, 442 U.S. at 274.
162 Rosenblum, supra note 156, at 277.
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fall not merely disproportionately, but exclusively, upon women.
That only women suffer the adverse effects of the imposition of
Norplant renders the imposition of Norplant a "case[] in which
impact alone can unmask an invidious discrimination."'' 6 Courts do
not order male child abusers to suffer a condition of probation
comparable to the imposition of Norplant because they cannot: there
is no birth-control method for men comparable to Norplant. Norplant
is effective and long-lasting, but relatively safe and reversible.
Enforcement of its use is easy. 'Because Norplant is a highly
effective method of birth control that does not depend upon a
woman's cooperation for its effectiveness, it provides those who wish
to control a woman's fertility with a relatively simple means to do
so.' 16 No such birth-control method for men exists. Enforcement of
the use of condoms is impracticable. Sterilization, because it is
irreversible, does not just impair, but destroys, a man's right to
procreation. Abstinence forbids sexual intercourse, a legal activity
too far removed from the offense of child abuse to be limited
constitutionally under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Also, the enforcement of abstinence is impracticable.
The lack of a birth-control method for men comparable to Norplant
guarantees that only female child abusers will be subject to the
adverse effects of the imposition of Norplant. The courts' creation of
a discriminatory classification that subjects only women to the
adverse effects of the imposition of Norplant "reflects invidious
gender-based discrimination."165
As argued above, with regard to the judicial imposition of a
condition of probation, the compelling interests of the state embrace
the rehabilitation of the offender and the protection of the public.
With regard to the imposition of Norplant as a condition of probation
for a female child abuser, the compelling interests of the state
embrace the rehabilitation of the child abuser and the protection of
the child abuser's existing children.
The gender-based classification created as a consequence of
the imposition of Norplant as a condition of probation for female
child abusers is not substantially related to the achievement of the
163 Feeney, 442 U.S. at 275 (comparing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356
(1886)).
164 Rosenblum, supra note 149, at 275.
165 Feeney, 442 U.S. at 274.
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state's important interests in the rehabilitation of child abusers and in
the protection of the existing children of child abusers. Opponents of
the imposition of Norplant rightly emphasize that the rationale on
which courts rely to justify the imposition of Norplant "applies with
equal force to male child abusers."'" Postponement of the additional
stresses of pregnancy, of childbirth, and of responsibility for another
child would promote the rehabilitation of a male child abuser, just as
it promotes the rehabilitation of a female child abuser. Postponement
of such stresses would promote the protection of the existing children
of a male child abuser, just as it promotes the protection of the
existing children of a female child abuser. The gender of a child
abuser and his or her rehabilitation are simply not related. Nor are the
gender of a child abuser and the protection of his or her existing
children. Because the gender-based classification created as a
consequence of the imposition of Norplant is not related, substantially
or otherwise, to the rehabilitation of child abusers and the protection
of the existing children of child abusers, the imposition of Norplant
as a condition of probation for female child abusers does not survive
constitutional scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
The development and approval of a birth-control method for
men comparable to Norplant and the imposition of that comparable
birth-control method for men as a condition of probation for male
child abusers would render the imposition of Norplant as a condition
of probation for female child abusers impervious to an equal
protection challenge grounded in gender-based discrimination.
Obliging male child abusers and female child abusers alike to
postpone the additional stresses of pregnancy, of childbirth, and of
responsibility for more children would eliminate the gender-based
discriminatory classification presently created as a consequence of the
imposition of Norplant. A contraceptive device for men comparable
to Norplant is presently being developed. 67 The device consists of
two plastic capsules which are implanted in a man's body.68 The first
capsule contains a hormone which, released over time, suppresses the
166 Burke, supra note 145, at 241-42.
167 Rachel Tan, Contraceptive Implants for Men Being Developed, STRAITS
TIMEs, Feb. 19, 1993, at 31.
168 Id.
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production of sperm.'69 Because that hormone incidentally and
undesirably suppresses the production of testosterone, the male sex
hormone, the second capsule contains a second hormone which, also
released over time, reverses the first hormone's suppression of
testosterone production. 7  The device is highly effective." Its
contraceptive effect is long-lasting," but "reversible almost
immediately."'" The device is expected to be available within ten
years. 74 Once the device is available and courts order its use as a
condition of probation for male child abusers, the imposition of
Norplant as a condition of probation for female child abusers will no
longer be susceptible to an equal protection challenge grounded in
gender-based discrimination.
Conclusion
The high rate of recidivism in cases of child abuse
demonstrates that traditional conditions of probation for child abusers
cannot be relied upon to achieve either the rehabilitation of child
abusers or the protection of abused children. New conditions of
probation for child abusers are desperately needed. The imposition
of Norplant as a condition of probation for female child abusers
promises to promote both the rehabilitation of child abusers and the
protection of abused children. By postponing a female child abuser's
suffering the additional stresses of pregnancy, of childbirth, and of
responsibility for another child, the imposition of Norplant affords the
child abuser time to learn how to bear the stresses of parenthood and
of life. It assures the child abuser's existing children that their
parent's efforts to learn will not be disrupted.
Norplant is a technological advancement which
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society would be foolish not to consider given the
extent of the problems involved. Proper use of such
devices can't solve the problem, but it can surely help.
Our society needs a similar device for irresponsible
fathers as well.175
Until our society obtains a similar device for irresponsible fathers, the
right of women to equal protection of the laws precludes the
imposition of Norplant as a condition of probation for female child
abusers. Once a birth-control method for men comparable to
Norplant becomes available, the imposition of Norplant as a
condition of probation for female child abusers and the imposition of
the comparable birth-control method for men as a condition of
probation for male child abusers will be constitutionally permissible,
despite the consequent impairment of the fundamental rights of
individual child abusers. The less restrictive means available for
advancing the state interests in the rehabilitation of child abusers and
the protection of abused children do not advance those interests as
effectively as the imposition of Norplant and its counterpart for men
will allow.
175 Dozier, I., supra note 125, quoted in Grady & Christianson, supra note
125, at 1.
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